Council in June I9I6 that African labourers from South Africa and other parts of Africa should be recruited and sent to France in order to relieve the serious labour shortage at the front and in the French ports (where the shortage of shipping necessitated a more rapid turnover) which had been accentuated by the effects of the Somme offensive. Shortly afterwards, agreement was reached with the South African government over the matter. General Botha himself, as both Prime Minister and Minister for Native Affairs, played a key part in the negotiations. From the outset, there was no question of these black South African labourers being engaged in any combatant capacity. This was a point upon which all major sections of white South African society were agreed. It had been one of the most important understandings-in theory at least-upon which hostilities during the Anglo-Boer War had been conducted, although it was frequently deviated from in practice. It was based on the belief that if black and white were acknowledged to be fighting with and against each other on equal terms this was likely to seriously undermine the future maintenance of the existing state of black/white relationships by devaluing the concept of race as an effective means of forestalling the emergence of class as an alternative, overt, basis for the organization of social and political relations. Just a little below the surface-at the time of the Anglo-Boer War as during World War I-was the fear that the experience on the part of Africans in bearing arms and in operating with whites in conditions likely to lead to a breakdown of the social colour bar would have wider implications and would contribute to the removal of one of the chief obstacles to the emergence of a united working class in South Africa. Such beliefs were, in 19I2, enshrined in Section 7 of the South African Defence Act. It was to this that the Secretary of Defence referred W. B. Rubusana in 1914 (when he offered to accompany a force of 5,000 'able bodied men' to the German South-West African front), stating that 'the Government does not desire to avail itself of the services, in a combatant capacity, of citizens not of European descent in the present hostilities. Apart from other considerations', the Secretary went on, 'the present war is one which has its origins among the white people of Europe and the Government are anxious to avoid the employment of its native citizens in warfare against whites'.10 Some of these 'other considerations' were expressed rather more clearly some time after this when the East Rand Express commented with alarm upon news of the proposal that Great Britain intended to use Indian troops against the Germans:
If the Indians are used against the Germans they will return to India disabused of the respect they should bear for the white race. The empire must uphold the principle that a coloured man must not raise his hand against a white man if there is to be any law or order in either India, Africa, or any part of the Empire where the white man rules over a large concourse of coloured people. In South Africa it will mean that Natives will secure pictures of whites chased by coloured men, and who knows what harm such pictures may do?ll And how much more harm would be done, was the unspoken question, if black South Africans themselves were doing the chasing?
Such official guidelines and popular (white) opinion did not, however, preclude the use of black South African labour for military purposes in a non-combatant capacity. Some 35,000 Africans were in fact employed in the German South-West African campaign 'not for fighting purposes, but for that class of employment that was exclusively or ordinarily suited to Natives-such as Drivers, Leaders, and general labourers in the supply and other units of the Defence Force'.l2 A further I8,ooo subsequently served in similar capacities in the East African campaign.
Service in Europe was, however, almost universally regarded as something qualitatively different, and when the proposals were first announced in South Africa in late I916 they resulted predictably in some strong opposition. The important new factor was the question of the likely impact of European conditions, and opposition was commonly expressed in terms of 'dangers of contamination' and 'exposure to evil influences'. The eminent Cape liberal, J. X. Merriman, writing to Smuts in East Africa, was amongst those who strongly disapproved of the project: intermediate categories were Lance Corporals, Hospital Orderlies, Sergeants, and Clerk Interpreters.14 Appeals for recruits were widely publicized-via local Native Commissioners, magistrates, African newspapers, at special recruiting meetings, and, later on, from the pulpits of churches.15 One of the most noticeable aspects of the recruiting campaign was the extent to which members of the educated African elite lent their active support. At one level this class regarded the scheme as an opportunity for Africans to demonstrate their loyalty to King and country in the hope that this would give their leaders a bargaining counter in terms of political rights when hostilities ceased: much was accordingly made of the rhetoric that accompanied statements of war aims from the British side. Related to this was the way in which African leaders themselves saw in the recruitment campaign a more immediate opportunity of stressing their own importance and influence to the authorities. In recruiting labour for the German South-West African campaign the South African authorities had done much to ensure the co-operation of African leaders for both that campaign and subsequently for the S.A.N.L.C. by involving them in discussions, tacitly acknowledging their influence in a way that held out hope that this would continue on a regular basis. After Colonel Pritchard (Director of Native Labour) had discussed the question of recruitment with various African leaders in I9I5, Ilanga lase Natal responded as follows:
He [Colonel Pritchard] was the one official of the Government who was administering Native Affairs in the right direction-namely, by consulting the Natives in matters in which they are interested and for not hesitating to take them into confidence... They as members of the Native Congress would not shrink from assisting the Government. 16 In I9I6 the Government again involved the leaders of the South African Native National Congress in similar discussions, although this did not extend to incorporating their suggestions about the way in which the S.A.N.L.C. ought to be organized: 'whatever may be the merits of the suggestions put forward by Congress, they came at too late an hour to admit of adoption', the Native Affairs Department informed J. L. Dube (President of the Congress).17 He and his colleagues assisted, nevertheless. Solomon Plaatje's good offices were also sought as soon as he arrived back in South Africa in March I917: he was asked by General Botha, so he (Plaatje) related, 'to use his influence in obtaining recruits, and said this would help the native people better than any propaganda work in which he could engage. Recognizing the truth of General Botha's remarks', Plaatje had therefore gone on to do precisely this.18
Towards the end of 1917 there also appeared a pamphlet by F. Z. S. Peregrino entitled His Majesty's Black Labourers: a treatise on the Camp Life of the S.A.N.L.C., a rambling account of 'camp life' at the Rosebank depot in Cape Town whose main purpose was to attract further recruits but which provided at the same time an opportunity for its author to recommend himself to the authorities. 19 A variety of reasons was presented by both Africans and Europeans involved in the recruiting campaign as to why Africans should join up with the S.A.N.L.C. One correspondent writing to Ilanga lase Natal in October 1916 felt that opposition from whites to the raising of the Contingent was in itself 'the best proof that the Contingent is a good thing to the natives', and that it would provide 'the great chance to acquire a just and recognized status as loyal subjects of the crown'.20 Peregrino stressed similar themes, but discoursed also on the spectre of displacement by 'the cute yellow man', the benefits of a free uniform ('valued at a moderate assessment at ?12'), and the general opportunity for Africans to prove themselves possessed of all the recognized manly virtues.21
Special recruiting meetings took place up and down the country. One of these, addressed by both black and white local dignitaries, took place in Kimberley in June 19I7. The predominant theme in nearly all the addresses was the appeal to altruistic motives of loyalty and devotion to King, country, and empire. Lurid images were created of what was likely to happen to both black and white South Africans if the Germans were to be allowed to triumph. The local officer in charge of recruiting was concerned also to point to the more practical advantages of joining up: 'the pay was good, the feeding was good, and the clothing was good'.22 Both Sol Plaatje and his brother-in-law, I. Bud Mbelle (the latter by telegram as he was unable to be present) stressed the educational advantages of service overseas. Bud Mbelle's view, read out by the Mayor of Kimberley, was that 'by going to France our people should realize that they are going Both in Kimberley and in most of the rest of South Africa, however, the recruiting campaign met with a poor response after the first two or three months. Patriotism, it soon became apparent, was not going to be enough. In a renewed appeal in July I917 General Botha expressed his appreciation of the valuable work done by those who had already joined up, but regretted the decline in the numbers of those coming forward. He considered this due to the fact that Africans had not 'fully realized the greatness of the call upon them'.24 The poor response was a matter of concern to both the South African government with its increased commitment to the Imperial war effort, and to those African leaders who hoped to make political capital out of an overwhelming demonstration of 'loyalty', and who risked a somewhat dangerous identification with an unsuccessful government scheme.
Those who did enlist, however, did so for a variety of reasons. The recruiting campaign was much affected also by the fact of its direct association with the South African authorities, although technically they were acting on behalf of the Imperial government. Because it was carried out to a large extent through the existing channels of administration (local Native Commissioners, magistrates, etc.), response was inevitably coloured by the deeply felt distrust that was attached to individuals and institutions associated with the South African government. Regretting the lack of response to the recruiting campaign in Natal (only 629 by June I917), Ilanga lase Natal commented: We are not much surprised at this, knowing as we do the feeling of our people at the present time towards the powers that be. Recent legislation does not deceive even the most unsophisticated amongst us as to our ultimate destination as the result of the Natives Land Act, and worse still the so-called Native Administration Bill.35 Sol Plaatje, similarly, blamed 'the Union's method of administering native affairs' for the poor response.36 Unrest generated by the Natives' Land Act of I913 was probably also at the heart of suspicions felt by some Africans (and taken by Earl Buxton as a reason for its lack of success) that recruitment was 'an insidious attempt on the part of the Government to entice away men so that land could be seized in their absence'.37 Individuals selected by the government to take charge of recruiting were not always those most likely to inspire confidence in the government's intentions. In Natal, the choice for recruiting officer was Sir George Leuchars, whose brutal handling of the Bambatha rebellion in I906 was well remembered in that part of the world. 'That fact alone', noted one correspondent to the Natal Mercury, 'will contribute to militate against the success in recruiting natives in the Province and Zululand'.38 Undoubtedly it did.
General Colonel Pritchard, the officer appointed to command the S.A.N.L.C., had been sent to France in October I9I6 in order to make the necessary arrangements, but in effect also to present to the War Council the conditions upon which the South African government was prepared to cooperate in the scheme. The stipulations that Pritchard made at the conference convened to deal with the matter were that 'Natives should be segregated'; that 'they should be administered in accordance with military law under the Army Act by officers appointed by that [i.e. the South African] Government'; and that 'they should be employed elsewhere than in the fighting zone'. It was further agreed that 'the most suitable employment would be quarrying, road making, forestry, etc.', on account of the fact that 'the difficulties of segregation which would arise in towns would be reduced if the Natives were engaged on such work'.44 The decision on the part of the South African government to stipulate conditions of this kind sprang from the belief in the necessity to insulate members of the S.A.N.L.C. as far as possible from 'dangers of contamination' which contact with 'the social conditions of Europe' was widely, and very seriously, held to be otherwise inevitable-and thereby to defuse opposition from white interests to the scheme. There was a further factor involved here. Once the decision had been taken to send the S.A.N.L.C. to Europe a number of missionaries, Native Affairs Department officials and others concerned with 'the native problem' realized fairly quickly that the scheme provided an ideal opportunity for testing-in what would, it was hoped, be carefully controlled conditions-the practicability and effects of the implementation of certain segregatory devices of social control; the lessons and results of this experiment could possibly be utilized in South Africa itself. It was perceived as a test, in other words, of the efficacy of ideas that were coming increasingly to bridge the gap between hitherto rather more distinct liberal and segregationalist positions. It is possible that General Botha's apparent personal enthusiasm for the raising of the S.A.N.L.C. owed something to his perception of the use to which the scheme could be put, and hence also the very frequent use of the terms 'experiment' or 'social experiment' that accompanied nearly every discussion of the subject. lives and those which applied to others around them engaged in the common struggle. Even before the S.A.N.L.C. units reached their camps in France, many had seen or heard things likely to stimulate both a questioning attitude towards their conditions after arrival and towards those ideological precepts that had given rise to them. Several of the transport ships, for example, stopped at Sierra Leone where at least some African members were allowed to disembark. One of them, Marks Mokwena, was particularly impressed by the fact that 'the people of that territory (Sierra Leone) were pure black negroes of very high educational attainments equal to that of the best Europeans', an observation that he communicated to a large political meeting in South Africa after his return by way of contrast to the existing state of things in his own country.65 For Jason Jingoes, one of the things that he remembered about his arrival in England prior to embarkation for France was the reception accorded to his colleagues and himself by white women in Liverpool: 'Although white women had served us with tea in Cape Town, we knew they were only doing it because we were going to war. These girls were different'. Elsewhere, discontent over food seems to have provided the focal point for the expression of a far wider range of grievances. For whatever reasons, the authorities seem to have departed radically from the scale of rations that was initially laid down and incorporated into the contracts for service. Trouble developed over this at the training camp at Rosebank in Cape Town, but assumed more serious proportions in France. At Jason Jingoes's camp in Dieppe, the usual rations were replaced by meallie meal. What was more, Jingoes told his commanding officer, it was 'bad and had weavils in it'. His complaint led to serious charges of insubordination being laid against him, but fortunately-thanks to the arrival of a new officer to take command of the camp-he avoided being court-martialled and the food was improved. The new Commanding Officer was quick to recognize that the food was indeed rotten, and even thanked Jingoes for pointing the fact out to him. Jingoes not surprisingly felt triumphant, but was left with a particular sense of grievance against white clergymen (which was no doubt felt by others against Captain Barrett) as a result of the leading role played by the white chaplain in reporting and accusing him. 73 This particular incident had provided a focus for the expression of other grievances, and it is likely that it was paralleled in other camps. There were other causes for discontent. Night shift working was reported as being very unpopular, as also was work on handling bales of forage. When S.A.N.L.C. camps were shelled by German artillery some of the Companies drew up a petition 'stating that they wished to be removed from the danger zone' on the grounds that their contracts stated that they were to be employed on dock work. When the removals began, however, other Companies strongly objected to this and 'protested that this was a slur on their character and loyalty as soldiers'.74 These may or may not have been the same series of events described by Koos Matli in Camp Griffiths:
There we had a hard time, because nearly every evening we were attacked by the enemy planes and we had nothing to defend ourselves with. This camp was twice in flames during enemy attacks.
We formed a committee and after some discussions agreed to send a letter to England. We wrote the letter and explained our condition. We addressed the letter to His Majesty King George V. We gave the letter to one of the soldiers to post for us, since we were not allowed to go out of Camp. 
